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I. INTRODUCTION
The European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development ("EBRD") was created
in 1990 by multilateral agreement for the
nations of Central and Eastern Europe, to
ease the transition from centrally
dominated economies to private market
systems. As the newest multilateral
development bank ("MDB"), the EBRD
presents a great opportunity to challenge
existing lending practices of MDBs and to
develop a new model for MDBs. The
EBRD immediately set itself apart from
other MDBs by establishing in its Articles
of Agreement two unique goals. First,
the EBRD will limit its role as the
facilitator of market economy transition
to those member states "committed to
and applying the principles of multiparty
democracy, pluralism, and market
economies."' The EBRD itself is
committed to principles of democracy in
its own banking activities.2  Second,
unlike any other bank charter, the EBRD
agreement expressly promotes
environmentally sound and sustainable
development.2
Other multilateral development banks
have been criticized for supporting
projects with destructive environmental,
cultural, and even economic impacts.
Until recently, the World Bank
rationalized its practices by claiming that
it is solely a financial institution and
therefore not accountable for the
destructive impacts of its investments.'
By contrast, the EBRD expressly
mandates that it will involve itself in
environmental and political issues5
Despite its laudable goals, with
investments in full swing, the EBRD's
present institutions do not provide the
mechanisms necessary to achieve its
goals.6 To effectively insert itself into a
democratic process and achieve
environmentally sound and sustainable
development, the EBRD must create a
mechanism which empowers citizens to
review projects for consistency with the
EBRD's functions and purposes, thereby
enabling them to protect their
environment against ill-advised projects.
This article suggests that the EBRD
-can best meet the demands of promoting
environmentally sound projects in a
democratic system through the creation
of an independent review board. The
history of other MDBs and the present
environmental problems in Central and
Eastern Europe demonstrate the need for
an institution that grants individuals,
particularly local residents, a means to
challenge environmentally harmful
projects. Not only have many prior MDB
projects devastated the environment and
indigenous populations, but bank policies
designed to remedy these problems
remain unenforced or ignored.7
The extent of the environmental
degradation in Central and Eastern Europe
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requires no further elaboration. The
environmental crises in some areas, such
as Poland's Upper Silesia,
Czechoslovakia's Northern Bohemia, and
Romania's Copsa Mica, are particularly
acute; these areas constitute some of the
most polluted in the world." This
devastation serves as the backdrop for
future activities of the EBRD.
The causes of the environmental crisis
in this region are many and include the
lack of pollution control and effluent
treatment technologies for heavy industry
and power plants, energy inefficiency in
domestic and industrial uses,
chemical-intensive agriculture, soil
mismanagement, and lack of vehicular
pollution control.' Although the causes
emanate from all sectors of the economy
and population, they are systemic,
resulting fundamentally from a lack of
democracy. 10 For over forty years, the
former governments of Central and
Eastern Europe imposed their will on the
people. The people lacked the basic
information necessary to assess their
condition and lacked recourse to an
institution capable of fairly addressing
their concerns and protecting their
environment.1"
The EBRD, in assisting the transition
toward market-oriented economies and
democratic forms of government, and in
promoting sustainable development, must
ensure that the problems it seeks to
resolve are not inadvertently perpetuated
by its own institutional framework. The
founders recognized this responsibility in
drafting its Articles, mandating that the
EBRD carry out its operations in
furtherance of democratic principles and
that its activities promote
environmentally sound practices and
sustainable development. 2
The EBRD must translate recognition
of its responsibility to ensure democracy
into meaningful procedures within its
own institutional framework as well as in
its investment choices. First and
foremost, democracy is a method by
which to derive political decisions."
That is, decision-making must be under
the domination of the people'4 -
domination in the sense that all people
have freedom of choice, are politically
equal, and participate in making
decisions. Participation preserves
fundamental human rights and develops
political competency. Participation, in its
broadest sense, is a force capable of
advancing the interests of the
individual."
I1. AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW
BOARD AND PRINCIPLES OF
DEMOCRACY
Although majority rule is at the heart
of democracy," it also protects the
rights of minorities. "'7 Thus, democracy
must be defined by participation which
grants every citizen the opportunity to
discuss actions in an open and public
manner so that such actions can be taken
for the benefit of the entire community,
not just the majority." Implicit within
these precepts are reviewability of
decisions and access to information. To
participate effectively and maintain one's
freedom of choice, one must be able to
pose questions and offer informed and
articulate answers. 9  Access to
information provides individuals with the
means to ask the proper questions.
Independent review, both
administrative and judicial, ensures
citizens that their rights to information
and participation are enforced and that
their concerns are considered in the
decision-making process. The judicial
process becomes a vehicle for self
government - the very notion of a
democracy."0  Citizen participation,
which includes access to information and
the courts, defines democracy as much
as does majority rule."' Citizen
participation also safeguards minority
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interests. Judicial review, which
guarantees citizens a participatory role,
"is thoroughly consistent with the
primacy of majority rule" and principles of
democracy."2
From a practical perspective, an
independent review board, willing to
defend individual rights against abuse by
those in power, is critical to
democracy."3  One cannot justify
granting authority to a group of officials
without some mechanism which assures
that they remain accountable to those
they serve.
24
Government officials should not view
citizen participation, citizen suits, and
independent review of decisions with
hostility. Rather, they should view these
events as part of the total
decision-making process.2 5  This
process of review simply determines
whether or not unelected bureaucrats,
who are not directly accountable to the
legislature and not directly supervised by
the President, make decisions consistent
with legislative intent. Thus, independent
review merely compensates for these
limitations placed upon agencies and the
legislature.26  When viewed in this
manner, the focus of a court's decision is
not confined to one particular case.
Rather, it encompasses the ability of the
judiciary and citizens to modify the
agency decision-making process and
agency decisions.2 7  In fact,
commentators have suggested that civil
actions brought by citizens significantly
contributed to achieving the National
Environmental Policy Act's28 goal of
improved agency decision-making.29
Il. AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW
BOARD AND THE EBRD
In the context of the EBRD, effective
environmental policy likely will involve
establishment of regulatory and
monitoring processes both in the
borrower countries and within the EBRD
itself. Successful implementation of an
EBRD environmental policy is dependent
upon a mechanism to review those
regulatory and monitoring processes.
First, without such a mechanism, neither
the public nor the EBRD itself can be
assured that the EBRD's procedures are
successfully implementing its stated
policy. Second, reviewability provides a
means to ensure that the EBRD fulfills its
mandate to promote environmentally
sound and sustainable development.
Third, as has been shown, a review
board provides citizens with a means to
effectively participate in a democratic
process.
Establishing an independent review
board and permitting access to bank
information are policies which, although
foreign to MDBs, are commonplace in
democratic nations. In addition,
administrative review boards are common
to many national legal systems and
throughout international institutions.2
0
Furthermore, the EBRD charter makes
clear that its objective is not only to
foster market-oriented economies but
also democratic governments. The
charter explicitly states that where a
member state implements policies
inconsistent with multiparty democracy
and market economies, the EBRD can
suspend bank resources or take other
action it deems appropriate. 1 Thus, by
adopting an independent review board,
the EBRD would merely be adhering to
the democratic values it has chosen to
follow, requiring of itself the same
democratic processes it requires of its
members.
The political intentions of the EBRD
stand in stark contrast to those of the
World Bank, which has stated
unequivocally that only economic
considerations shall be relevant to its
lending decisions and that it shall not
interfere with the political affairs of any
"member state. " " The contrast is
instructive. 'Until recently, the World
Bank seemingly felt justified in denying
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review of its decisions because its
decisions were made purely on economic
grounds. Distinctions between politics
and economics, however, are not static
and are often blurred. Recognition of this
interrelationship has apparently inspired
the World Bank to allow its practices to
be made public and establish links with
indigenous groups and nongovernmental
organizations. Even so, access to World
Bank information seems more a privilege
than a right.3"
By contrast, the EBRD has clearly
defined . its objective of promoting
democracy in Central and Eastern
Europe, in addition to its commitment to
environmentally sound and sustainable
development. It has placed itself in a
position where its activities must be
viewed as part of a political process. The
EBRD has chosen to make loans for the
purpose of promoting initiatives
committed to democratic principles.
Consequently, citizens affected by the
EBRD's lending activities should have the
right to challenge investment decisions.
To provide loans without granting review
rights to citizens is a denial of the very
rights the EBRD seeks to promote.
In spite of its clearly stated
commitment to democratic processes, to
date the EBRD has refused to include
provisions for citizen review of its
decisions. The EBRD argues, as other
MDBs have, that it is a private financial
institution, with no obligation to the
general public. This argument fails as
applied to MDBs 34 generally and to the
EBRD specifically. MDBs are described
more accurately as public institutions, not
private. The international community has
established MDBs to better public welfare
worldwide. The World Bank's mission is
to promote the "development of
productive facilities and resources" to
improve the general welfare of the
citizens of borrowing countries.3 6
Similarly, the EBRD seeks to promote
market economies and democracy among
the ruins of Central and Eastern Europe's
economy and environment. Thus, the
EBRD, like the World Bank, has an
essentially public function.
Further, MDBs are publicly funded,
receiving billions of dollars from
taxpayers around the world for project
lending. These taxpayers also provide
the capital necessary for MDBs to
borrow billions more to finance
lending."8 Given these two factors,
lending decisions by MDBs are
indisputably public decisions, and the
MDBs are public servants.3 '
The EBRD Articles themselves
demonstrate that the EBRD considers
itself to be much more than a typical
financial institution by stating its dual
commitments to promoting both
democracy and environmentally sound
and sustainable development. 8 If the
popular protests which shook Central and
Eastern Europe are to be given any
meaning, citizens must be granted the
right to participate in the decision-making
process for which they fought. In
promoting democratic processes and
citizen participation within member
nations, the EBRD should make a
commitment to democratic processes
within its own structure by implementing
an independeni review board.
The reticence of the EBRD and other
MDBs to include citizens In the
decision-making process remains a
mystery, particularly in light of the rise of
democracy around the globe. This
proposal for independent review and
increased participatory democracy in the
EBRD is less an extension of this trend
than a basic tenet. Independent review
simply emphasizes that for full
effectiveness in carrying out the EBRD's
goals, citizens must have the ability to
challenge bank decisions through a
democratic process. More specifically,
once the charter is ratified and in force,
any person who feels aggrieved by an
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action of the EBRD must be able to
challenge that action in accordance with
the principles of democracy, respect for
human rights, and the rule of law.
IV. INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND
THE ENVIRONMENT
Commentators and lawmakers alike
see public participation as a means to
protect environmental concerns from
administrative arbitrariness.* 9  In
particular, judicial review of
administrative actions is a necessary
component of the public participation
process to "ensure that the
administrative process itself will confine
and control the exercise of
discretion."' The proliferation of
citizen suits41 and judicial review42 in
the United States can be attributed in
large part to the access to courts created
by environmental statutes aimed at
remedying the historic
underrepresentation and dismissal of
environmental concerns in the
administrative process. Before citizen
suits and judicial review were statutorily
authorized, agencies were granted broad
regulatory discretion,4 4  were
insufficiently accountable for decisions
negatively affecting the environment, and
were "captured" by the private interests,
such as polluting industries, that they
regulated. 4 1
As recently adopted, the EBRD
procedures regulating public participation
in the decision-making process48 allow
the same discretion to ignore citizens'
environmental concerns as the US
system once did. 7  Further, the
language of the EBRD's draft
Environmental Policy presents the same
dangers that have enabled other MDBs to
undervalue or dismiss local environmental
concerns: citizens do not have a right
even to read the environmental
assessment before a development or
funding decision is made.' Thus,
while EBRD lending decisions will, as a
matter of course, involve all those with a
financial interest at stake, the same
cannot be said for those with
environmental interests that may be
affected."'
Given the existing state of the
environment in Central and Eastern
Europe and the EBRD's commitment to
the environment, the importance of
public participation and the ability to
challenge actions of the Bank must be
recognized. By involving those people
affected by the physical manifestation of
a project in the decision-making process,
the EBRD will be directly promoting
environmentally sound projects as well as
demonstrating a commitment to and the
application of democracy. Democracy,
founded on the principles of freedom of
choice, political equality, and
participation, demands that those whose
rights are threatened by environmental
degradation have recourse to a forum in
which they may voice their grievances.
The EBRD also has pledged itself to
finance only those projects which
promote sustainable development.
Sustainable development is "a matter of
responsible, informed behavior by
individuals and groups . . . behavior
(which] is likely only when people have
full control over their lives and access to
the resources required," including
information. 0  Information and the
ability to employ that information before
an independent review board are
essential for defense against practices
which may adversely impact sustainable
development. Global sustainability
originates at and can only be assured at
the community level."' The EBRD,
therefore, has the responsibility to ensure
that local communities have access to
information and a means to use this
information to protect themselves.
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V. COORDINATING THE
PROPOSED EBRD REVIEW WITH
OTHER EUROPEAN
INSTITUTIONS
In addition to the democratic and
environmental considerations set out
above, the unstable political situation and
lack of environmental legislation in
Central and Eastern Europe may
necessitate the establishment of an
independent review board to facilitate
citizen challenges to EBRD-funded
projects. Although the governments of
Central and Eastern Europe recognize the
need for national environmental
legislation, they generally lack the
technical competence and institutional
capacity to implement it. Without
comprehensive national environmental
laws and effective enforcement, citizens
have no mechanism for challenging
EBRD-funded projects within their
countries. An independent review board
within the EBRD could provide the
necessary mechanism.
Two years have passed since
democratic reforms began, yet Romania
and Hungary still have not passed any
environmental legislation and Bulgaria has
passed only one general environmental
law. Although Czechoslovakia has
enacted three statutes, the split between
the Czech and Slovak republics leaves
effective enforcement in doubt, especially
as concern over the Gabcikovo Dam
Project continues to divide politicians in
the two republics. 2 Romania has gone
through two governments within the past
year, is expecting a third in May 1992,
and recently restructured its entire
judicial system. Moreover, courts in
Central and Eastern Europe have never
dealt with citizen suits before. Under
these unstable political conditions, the
ability of citizens to challenge
EBRD-funded projects through their own
judicial processes and for consistency
with their own laws is extremely limited.
Thus, there is a need for another
mechanism by which they may challenge
EBRD-funded projects.
The EBRD is a well-financed
institution with technical experts from
around the world and a commitment to
democratizing Central and Eastern
Europe; it should create its own
independent review board without
awaiting the final outcome of legislative
and political events in the region. A
review process within the EBRD would
assure citizens a means of redress
against EBRD-funded projects until
comprehensive national environmental
legislation is implemented.
Even after these countries enact
effective environmental laws, the
continued presence of the EBRD's review
board would not be problematic. The
great disadvantage of relying on states to
implement their own legislation Is the
likelihood of inconsistent rules governing
review. The EBRD could offer a uniform
review process to adjudicate the
procedural and substantive rights granted
to citizens by the EBRD, and in addition
make findings based upon the law of
member states. A uniform process
would make citizens, as well as
investors, secure in the knowledge that
one institution will interpret those rights
and obligations.
Ultimately, if the EBRD agrees to be or
otherwise becomes bound by European
Community law, decisions of the review
board could be made appealable. Some
member nations of the EEC hear appeals
by those aggrieved by administrative
decisions. A similar provision relative to
the EBRD would therefore not be
inconsistent.
VI. ADVANTAGES OF AN
INDEPENDENT REVIEW BOARD
There are many possible forms a
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review process could take. One
alternative is review of all aspects,
environmental and otherwise, of a project
by staff members within the department
preparing the loan. The obvious
advantage of this method is that the
reviewing staff has intimate knowledge
of the proposed project. The experience
of the World Bank, which uses this type
of review, however, has shown that such
a mechanism inadequately protects
environmental interests. Staff become
personally interested in the financial
aspects of the loan because the amount
of capital they transfer is the basis upon
which their performance is evaluated and
promotions are granted.63  When
decision-making is premised solely on the
financial aspects of a loan, a lack of
objectivity is inevitable. The World Bank
had an opportunity to remedy this
situation when it created its Environment
Department. Unfortunately, the
Environment Department does not
influence or monitor development
projects on a day-to-day basis. 4
Review by senior management offers
another alternative. Again, the
experience of the World Bank is
instructive. Within the-World Bank,
twenty-two Executive Directors represent
the 152 member states. Although the
Executive Directors must approve all
loans and major policy changes, approval
occurs so late in the project cycle that
projects are very difficult to modify or
stop.5" In addition, senior management
often lacks the time necessary to
properly evaluate environmental
concerns. Moreover, senior management
is populated largely by administrators
unfamiliar with technical issues.
Review by an independent board
avoids problems associated with other
forms of review. First, an independent
board would have the ability to consider
the entire lending process free from
concerns about job security or pressures
from Bank staff, members, investors, and
environmental advocates. Unbiased and
objective analysis of potential projects is,
if not assured, certainly more likely.
Ideally, the board should include highly
qualified individuals from diverse
disciplines so that its composition could
enhance objectivity and technical
competence. Thus, the board would be
capable of resolving complex
environmental and financial matters with
technical and other specialized input.
An independent review board would
also be able to work quickly without
concern for other MDB-related duties.
The board could devote all its energies to
the challenged action. Although the
process appears retroactive, initiated only
after the decisions have been made,
enforceable rights and obligations should
affect behavioral change earlier in the
official decision-making process and
result in better final decisions. Moreover,
a common review board applicable to all
EBRD member states, as well as
investors and citizens, eliminates
complicated jurisdictional issues which
may arise due to the international nature
of the EBRD, provided all member states
consent to its jurisdiction.
Perhaps the greatest advantage,
however, is that the people affected by a
project inherit a monitoring and
enforcement role and can affect the
decision-making process from its
inception, because their rights, and the
EBRD's substantive obligations, can be
enforced. Therefore, they will not be
alienated from those who make and
implement the decisions. Instead, they
will be a part of a society in which all
individuals participate in the decisions
which affect their lives.
VII. INTRODUCTION TO THE
MODEL PROVISIONS FOR AN
EBRD INDEPENDENT REVIEW
BOARD
The Model Provisions of the EBRD
Independent Review Board drafted by
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CIEL-US can serve as a model for any
MDB. (See Appendix to this article.) The
intent of the provisions is to create a
process by which the EBRD's actions can
be reviewed in an atmosphere where the
EBRD, project proponents, the Board and
citizens constitute a "partnership in
furtherance of the public interest."6"
The Model Provisions were first drafted
prior to meeting attorneys, law
professors, and other environmental
professionals from Central and Eastern
Europe. The Model Provisions which
follow were redrafted after several
consultations with these experts in
Central and Eastern Europe. In particular,
these provisions are based heavily upon
a workshop organized by the authors and
held in Budapest, Hungary in March
1991. The Workshop on Environmental
Protection and Citizen Participation in the
Lending Practices of the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development
brought together thirty-two "public
interest" minded attorneys, law school
professors, and other environmental
professionals from Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The nations of Central and Eastern
Europe have undergone unprecedented
change over the past two years as
citizens demanded their freedom and a
voice in the matters that concern them.
Having gained their freedom, they must
now turn their attention to how it is to be
distributed, for without proper
distribution, freedom remains a
mirage."
The EBRD has established itself as a
vehicle to promote the rights and
freedoms associated with democracy:
freedom of choice, the right to participate
in decision-making processes, and the
right to maintain political equality.
Creation of an independent review board
which provides individuals and groups
with access to relevant financial and
environmental information regarding
proposed development projects will help
ensure protection of these rights.
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APPENDIX
MODEL PROVISIONS OF
THE EBRD
INDEPENDENT
REVIEW BOARD
Article I - Creation
A tribunal is established by the present
Statute to be known as the Independent
Review Board of the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (the
"Board").
Article'll -Jurisdiction1
1. The Board shall be competent to
hear and pass judgment upon final
actions of the EBRD including, but not
limited to, the non-observance of EBRD
procedures and funding of
environmentally destructive projects.
The Board may decide issues relating to
the adequacy of the environmental
impact assessment including, but not
limited to, the environmental impact
assessment's discussion of significant
impacts, cumulative impacts, indirect
impacts, mitigation plans, alternatives,
and impacts on another State. Moreover,
the Board may determine whether the
level of public participation and
consultation with other relevant
international and national agencies was
adequate. 2
2. The Board shall be open to:
a. any person who is a citizen of a
Member country;
b.any nongovernmental
organization which has an
interest in the economic and
environmental well-being of
Eastern Europe;
c. any community or political
subdivision within the countries
in which aid is to be distributed;
d. any member country; and
e. any member of the EBRD staff
alleging non-observance of the
contract of employment or terms
of appointment of such staff
member.
3
3. The Board shall have competence
to hear complaints as of the date of the
Board's formation.
4. The Board has competence to
resolve disputes concerning its
jurisdiction, competence, or questions of
procedure, subject to Article XI (appeals).
Article Ill - Composition
1. The Board shall be composed of
nine members, no two of whom may be
nationals of the same state.'
2. At least three members of the
Board shall have particular competence in
the biological sciences. At least one of
these members shall sit on each panel..
3. The members of the Board shall be
appointed as follows: three members will
be appointed by the Directors from the
countries of operation; three members
will be appointed by the Directors of the
other EBRD Member countries. The
Board members will sit for three years,
and they may be reappointed; provided,
however, that of the members initially
appointed', the terms of the three
members shall expire at the end of one
year and the terms of three other
members shall expire at the end of two
years. A member appointed to replace a
member whose term of office has not
expired shall hold office for the remainder
of his predecessor's term.
4. The Board shall sit with a minimum
of three members in a particular case.
5. No member of the presiding Board
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shall be of the same nationality as the
applicant."
6. No member of the Board can be
dismissed unless all other members are of
the unanimous opinion that he or she is
unsuited for further service.
Article IV - Oral Proceedings
1. The Board shall hold hearings at
dates to be fixed by rules established
pursuant to Article XV. Extraordinary
hearings may be invoked by the President
when necessary.
2. Oral proceedings shall normally be
held.7  Upon written agreement of all
parties, oral proceedings may be waived
upon consent of the Board. The oral
proceedings shall include the presentation
and examination of witnesses or experts,
and each party shall have the right to
present oral arguments and to comment
on the evidence given.
3. The Board may exclude evidence
which is irrelevant or lacking in probative
value. The Board may also limit the oral
testimony where it considers the written
documentation adequate.
4. The oral proceedings of the Board
shall be held in public."
5. Parties may be represented by an
attorney entitled to practice before a
court of a State party to the EBRD or a
State whose environment is alleged to be
adversely affected.
Article V - Organization
1. The Board shall elect a President
and two Vice-Presidents from among its
members.
2. The President shall make the
administrative arrangements necessary
for the functioning of the Board, including
naming an Executive Secretary.
3. The expenses of the Board shall be
borne by the EBRD.
Article VI - Information Requests9
1. Upon the request of any party in a
suit filed pursuant to this Statute, the
EBRD, and any of its functioning organs,
shall make available any information
relating to the challenged action.
Information includes, but is not limited to,
any documents, records, papers,
manuals, decisions, and any other
relevant material which purports to be, or
is in the nature of
a. an environmental Impact
assessment and any draft or
revision thereof;
b. monitoring data;
c. rules of procedure;
d. staff manuals;
a. statements of policy;
f. any information from the
applicant; or
g. comments or other data from
other governments."0
2. Paragraph One of this Article does
not apply to documents, papers,
manuals, decisions, and any other
materials that are
a. trade secrets (this term does not
include information which may
potentially place any person or
corporation at a competitive
disadvantage);"
b. personnel and medical files and
similar files, the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy; 12
c. memoranda created in
preparation for trial; or
d. not reasonably related to the
protested project.
EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 73
3. Any reasonably segregable portion
of a record shall be provided to any party
to an action under this Statute requesting
such information after deletion or
redaction of the portions which are
exempt under this Article.'3
4. Upon receipt of the request, the
EBRD has ten days in which to respond in
writing. A refusal to disclose information
shall be accompanied by detailed, written
reasons.
5. A party who believes that
information has been improperly withheld
may file a complaint with the Board,
which shall rule on the complaint.
6. The costs of fulfilling requests
under this Article shall be borne by the
EBRD when the request is made by a
citizen or nongovernmental organization
without a financial interest in the project.
Article VII - Remedies
1. The Board shall order the
cancellation of any EBRD action, findings,
or conclusions found to be:
a. in excess of authority;
b. not supported by the facts or
evidence; or
c. contrary to EBRD's Articles of
Agreement, including, for
example, activities that are not
sustainable.
2. The Board shall suspend any EBRD
action, findings, or conclusions found to
be in violation of procedures required by
the Charter, by-laws, rules, or other
governing instrument."
3. The Board shall compel EBRD action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed.
4. In making a determination pursuant
to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, the Board shall
review the whole record. The whole
record is limited to that information
published and made available to the
public as part of the environmental
impact assessment.
5. The Board may, in its discretion,
assess against the EBRD attorney's fees
and other costs reasonably related to a
case brought under this Statute in which
the applicant had reasonable grounds for
the suit."5
Article VIII - Decision-making
1. The Board shall make all decisions
by a majority vote. Separate and
dissenting opinions may be submitted as
well.
2. Subject to the provisions of Article
XI, the decisions of the Board shall be
final, binding, and res judicata on all
parties.' 8
3. In the event of an equality of votes,
the President or the member who acts in
such place shall cast the determining
vote.
4. The Board's judgments shall be in
writing and shall include findings of fact
and reasoning upon which the judgment
is founded.
5. The judgments shall be drawn up in
one of the official languages of the Board
and shall be deposited in the EBRD's
repository.
6. The Board shall deliver its judgment
within three months from the filing of the
application and within one month after
the last oral proceeding. If, in the opinion
of the Board, circumstances so justify,
this time limit may be extended.
7. A certified copy of the judgment
shall be communicated to each of the
parties in the case. Copies shall be made
available upon request to any interested
persons free of charge.
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Article IX - Applications
1. An application shall not be
receivable unless the decision impugned
is a final decision and the person
concerned has exhausted all other
available means of redress.
2. The complaint must be filed within
sixty (60) days after a final action of the
EBRD is made public.
3. An application may be filed as a
class action in accordance with
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this section.' 7
Article X - Effect of Application
When the Board finds that justice so
requires, it may immediately enjoin the
action or decision until final resolution of
the application.'"
Article XI - Appeals
1. If a member state, the EBRD, or the
person in respect to whom a judgment
has been rendered by the Board objects
to the judgment on the ground that the
Board exceeded its jurisdiction or
competence; has failed to exercise
jurisdiction vested in it; has erred on a
question of law relating to the provisions
of the Charter; or has committed a
fundamental error in procedure which has
occasioned a failure of justice, such
member state or political subdivision
thereof, the EBRD, or the person may,
within thirty days from the date of the
publication of the judgment, make a
written application to the International
Court of Justice asking the Committee"9
to request an advisory opinion from the
International Court of Justice on the
matter." o
2. Within thirty days from the receipt
of an application under paragraph 1 of
this article, the Committee shall decide
whether or not there is a substantial
basis for the application. If the
Committee decides that there is such a
basis, it shall request the advisory opinion
of the International Court of Justice. The
Committee shall forward to the
International Court of Justice the record
from the original proceeding and the
applicant's request for an advisory
opinion.
3. If no application is made under
Paragraph One of this Article, or if a
request to appeal is denied by the
Committee, the judgment of the Board
shall become final.
Article XII - Revision of Judgment
1. An application for revision of a
judgment may be made to the Board only
on discovery of a fact which is of such a
nature as to be a decisive factor, and
which, when the judgment was given,
was unknown to the Board and to the
party claiming the revision.
Article XIII - Intervention
1. Any party to whom the Board Is
open under Article II of the Statute may
apply to intervene in a case at any stage
thereof on the ground that he or she has
a right which may be affected by the
judgment to be given by the Board. 1
2. The President of the EBRD or any
other top ranking official of a department
of the EBRD may, upon giving previous
notice to the President of the Board,
intervene at any stage, if that official
considers that his or her respective
department may be affected by the
judgment of the Board.
3. Any party to whom the Board Is
open under Article II of the Statute may
be affected by the judgment of the Board
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may also be called to participate in the
proceedings at the request of any of the
parties or on the initiative of the Board.
4. The intervener must accept the
case as it finds the case at the time of
intervention. Applications to intervene
shall be limited to supporting or
requesting the rejection of the application
of one of the parties.
Article XIV - Legal Aid"2
1. A party who is unable to meet the
costs of the proceedings, wholly or in
part, may at any time apply for legal aid.
The application shall be accompanied by
evidence of the applicant's need of
assistance and, in particular, by a
document from the competent authority
certifying the asserted lack of means.
The application need not be made
through an attorney.
2. The Board shall review the
application and, after considering written
arguments from the opposing party,
decide whether legal aid should be
granted in full or in part, or whether it
should be refused. This order shall be
made without reasons and is not
appealable.
3. The Board may at any time, either
of its own motion or on application,
withdraw legal aid if the circumstances
which led to its being granted change
during the proceedings.
4. When legal aid is granted, the EBRD
shall bear the costs, and the EBRD shall
advance funds necessary to meet the
party's expenses.
Article XV - Rulemaking
Subject to the provisions of this
Statute, the Board shall establish rules
concerning:
a. election of the President and
Vice-Presidents;
b. constitution of panels envisaged
by Article III;
c. presentation of applications and
the procedure to be followed
with respect to them; and
d. other matters related to the
functioning of the Board.
Article XVI - Amendments
This Statute may be amended only by
the Board of Directors of the EBRD.
1. International administrative tribunals
have limited jurisdiction. Judgments of the
ILO Administrative Tribunal, 1956 ICJ 77,97.
The scope of a tribunal's jurisdiction Is thus
defined by its governing statutes and
instruments. Consequently, the jurisdictional
provision must be drafted carefully so as not
to preclude particular causes of actiqn.
2. See CIEL-US Workshop on Environmental
Protection and Citizen Participation in the
Lending Practices of the EBRD, Workshop
Statement (Mar 27, 1991) (Budapest,
Hungary) (on file with the authors)
("Workshop Statement"). The Workshop
Statement is a set of recommendations to the
EBRD and represents the views of the 32
attorneys and other environmental
professionals from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia, and other countries.
3. This provision is Included to allow the
Board to hear contract disputes as well. The
other administrative tribunals were created to
resolve these disputes, which are the focus of
their work. See, for example, The World Bank
Administrative Tribunal, in C.F. Amerasinghe,
ed, Documents on IntemationalA dmlnistrative
Tribunals 44 (Oxford, 1988).
4. Most international administrative
tribunals are composed of seven members
who sit in panels of three. Others are
composed of six and still others of three
members. A larger number may be
appropriate for this Board because its
jurisdiction Is broader and may entail more
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suits. exception.
5. Mandating that members have particular
competence In a field of expertise is not
novel. For example, the Appeals Board of the
European Space Agency requires that
members be "eminent persons with particular
competence in labour legislation and in staff
relations, preferably from the international
field." Statute of the Appeals Board of the
European Space Agency, Reg 34/1(iii), in
Amerasinghe, Documents at 148-49 (cited In
note 3).
6. This paragraph may seem Inconsistent
with the Independent nature of the Board.
The International Court of Justice allows a
party which does not have a judge of its
nationality on the Court to nominate an ad
hoc judge. However, no ad hoc judge has
ever ruled against his or her country. D.W.
Bowett, The Law of International Institutions
266-67 (Stevens & Sons, 4th ed 1982). In
the context of the EBRD, It is unclear what
ruling in favor of one's country would mean.
7. See Workshop Statement at 4 28 (cited
In note 2).
8. The vast majority of tribunals hold oral
proceedings In public with the stipulation that
they may be held In private if so needed in
exceptional circumstances. The term
"exceptional circumstances" is not defined in
a statute or rule of any administrative tribunal.
Also, most tribunals do not provide for
examination of the witnesses by the parties.
Rather, the witness gives a statement and
then the tribunal asks questions.
9. This provision is modeled after a section
of the United States Freedom of Information
Act, 5 USC § 552 (1988) ("FOIA").
10. See Workshop Statement at 14 7-8 & 23
(cited in note 2).
11. FOIA also includes the phrase "trade
secrets and commercial or financial
Information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential." 5 USC §
552(b)(4). This section has been omitted here
because any Information, in a bank
development project, has the potential to fall
Into a commercial or financial information
12. See 5 USC § 552(b)(6).
13. See 5 USC § 552(b).
14. Except for paragraph 1(b), paragraphs 1
and 2, while modeled after sections of the
United States Administrative Procedure Act, 5
USC §§ 702 & 706 (1988), are similar to
remedies provided In all other administrative
tribunal statutes.
15. The Appeals Board of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Arts 8(e)-(f), In C.F. Ameraslnghe, ed, 2
Statutes and Rules of Procedure of
International Administrative Tribunals 116,
124 (World Bank, rev ed 1983) ("Statutes*),
and the Appeals Board of the Institute for the
Management of Technology, Art 8(d), In Id at
144 & 148, provide for recovery of reasonable
fees, including witness and expert costs,
when the claimant had "good grounds" for
bringing the suit. United States citizen suit
provisions allow attorneys' fees for the
"prevailing party." See, for example, Clean
Air Act, 42 USCA § 7604(d) (West Supp
1991).
16. The idea of stare decisis does not exist In
the international administrative tribunals. As
the case law develops, however, the tribunals
develop a "jurisprudence constante" to which
reference is made In subsequent decisions.
Bowett, International Institutions at 325 (cited
in note 6). There exists a fundamental
principle of the administration of justice that
like cases should be decided alike. L. Neville
Brown & Francis Jacobs, The Court of Justice
of the European Communities 275 (Sweet &
Maxwell, 2d ed 1983).
17. See Workshop Statement at 125 ("(Tihe
Bank should allow citizens to sue using class
actions which more effectively protect
fragmented and diffuse populations.") (cited In
note 2).
18. While most statutes for International
administrative review expressly provide
otherwise, this powter to enjoin an action and
its use by US courts has been essential to the
success of the US environmental assessment
statute. See also id at 1 26 (calling for
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injunctive relief to prevent further
environmental degradation in Central and
Eastern Europe).
19. The Committee could be a subset of the
Board of Directors.
20. This appears to be the best choice for
review of this Board's decisions. The Court of
Justice of the European Communities sits in
three capacities: as the Court of the European
Coal and Steel Community of the European
Economic Community, and of the European
Atomic Energy Community. This court can
apply international law but relies on the treaty
provision of the three communities, the acts
of the communities' institutions and general
principles of law embodied within the
municipal law of the member states. The
right to challenge is available only to member
states and the executive bodies of the
communities. Thus, this court is Inaccessible
to many EBRD member nations.
The International Court of Justice may give
an advisory opinion on "any legal question" to
any body authorized in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations to make such a
request. Statute of the International Court of
Justice, Art 65. Requests for advisory
opinions must be made through the United
Nations General Assembly, the Security
Council and such other United Nations organs
as may be authorized by the General
Assembly. Id, Art 96. The EBRD would thus
have to request the General Assembly for
authorization. As of 1987, four organs of the
United Nations and fifteen specialized
agencies were authorized to seek advisory
opinions from the Court. Louis Henkin, et al,
International Law 651 (West, 2d ed 1987).
The advisory jurisdiction of the Court is
available to organizations but not to states.
However, a State may request that an
international organization make the request on
Its behalf.
Generally, advisory opinions of the Court
are not binding. Bowett, International
Institutions at 262-82 (cited in note 16).
They can be made binding on the parties,
however, if the parties so agree in a governing
instrument. See, for example, the
Administrative Tribunal of the International
Labour Organization Statute, Art 12, in
Amerasinghe, 2 Statutes (cited in note 15).
21. These provisions are generally found In
the rules generated by the tribunals.
Considering the importance of allowing
nongovernmental organizations to participate,
the Statute seems a better place to
incorporate such provisions.
22. This Article is modeled after the Rules of
Procedure for the Court of Justice for the
European Communities, Art 76, in
Amerasinghe, 2 Statutes at 38 & 57 (cited In
note 15). See also Workshop Statement at
29 (cited in note 2).
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